**Tags :** [[telephone-metadata]]; [[NSA]] > [!link] > zotero_link:: [Full Text PDF](zotero://select/library/items/NRAC2WPI) > [!cite] > citekey:: aradauAssemblingNonKnowledge2017 > [!abstract] > abstract:: Critical analyses of security have focused on the production of knowledge, techniques, and devices that tame unknowns and render social problems actionable. Drawing on insights from, science and technology studies and the emerging interdisciplinary field of “ignorance studies,” this article proposes to explore the enactment of non-knowledge in security and legal practices. Starting with legal challenges brought against the NSA and other intelligence agencies after the Snowden revelations about mass surveillance, it shows how different modes of non-knowledge are enacted and not just “tamed”: uncertainty, ignorance, secrecy, ambiguity, and error. The enactment of non-knowledge has important implications for how we understand security practices, the relation between security and law, and public challenges to mass surveillance in a digital world. On the one hand, the enactment of non-knowledge by security and legal professionals limits activist and NGO resistance to mass surveillance, when these are focused on claims to knowledge, disclosure, and transparency. On the other, reassembling non-knowledge and knowledge differently has generative political effects and opens new possibilities for intervention and resistance. > [!keywords] > keywords:: > [!authors] > authors:: Claudia Aradau > [!meta] > url:: https://doi.org/10.1093/ips/olx019 > doi:: > [!related] ```dataview TABLE created, updated as modified, tags, type FROM "" WHERE related != null AND contains(related, "aradauAssemblingNonKnowledge2017") ``` > [!hypothesis] > hypothesis:: > [!methodology] > methodology:: > [!result] Result(s) > results:: > [!summary] Summary of Key Points > summary:: ## Notes | <mark class="hltr-grey">Highlight Color</mark> | Meaning | | ---------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------- | | <mark class="hltr-red">Red</mark> | Disagree with Author | | <mark class="hltr-orange">Orange</mark> | Important Point By Author | | <mark class="hltr-yellow">Yellow</mark> | Interesting Point | | <mark class="hltr-green">Green</mark> | Important To Me | | <mark class="hltr-blue">Blue</mark> | Notes After Initial Iteration | | <mark class="hltr-purple">Purple</mark> | Literary Note To Lookup Later | - <mark class="hltr-yellow">"On February 26, 2013, a few months before the Snowden revelation”</mark> [Page 1](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/NRAC2WPI?page=1&annotation=XADJ3WJQ) - <mark class="hltr-yellow">"SA collection of telephone metadata for intelligence purposes”</mark> [Page 1](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/NRAC2WPI?page=1&annotation=EJVEBKCY) - <mark class="hltr-yellow">"metadata collection and “upstream” surveillance through data capture at Internet “backbone” networks”</mark> [Page 6](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/NRAC2WPI?page=6&annotation=2TBYWQ4H) - <mark class="hltr-green">"No doubt, the bulk telephony metadata collection program vacuums up information about virtually every telephone call to, from, or within the United States. That is by design, as it allows the NSA to detect relationships so attenuated and ephemeral they would otherwise escape notice. (ACLU v. Clapper 2013, 52, emphasis mine)”</mark> [Page 8](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/NRAC2WPI?page=8&annotation=KEGMUWNL) - <mark class="hltr-magenta">"The contention that metadata can reveal potential terrorists in the future is not evaluated by the same standards as the NGOs’ claims. By virtue of being speculative, the processing of metadata appears as “eminently reasonable”: It is eminently reasonable to believe that Section 215 bulk telephony metadata is relevant to counter-terrorism investigations. The government queries the telephony metadata to identify connections between suspected-terrorist selectors and their unknown contacts. JA 272. Bulk collection of telephony metadata makes it possible to draw those historical connections because there is no way to know in advance which metadata will be responsive to queries for those in contact with suspected-terrorist selectors. (Clapper et al. 2014, 32)”</mark> [Page 9](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/NRAC2WPI?page=9&annotation=X25HULDM) - <mark class="hltr-green">"n the one hand, the NSA argues that metadata is supposed to connect “fragmented and fleeting communications” on the path to know; on the other, the NSA also claims non-knowledge as it only collects information up to three hops and does not know the identity of the phone subscribers”</mark> [Page 9](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/NRAC2WPI?page=9&annotation=US84ZTLV) - <mark class="hltr-yellow">"language of “intelligence collection” or “bulk metadata collection” to avoid public criticism of mass surveillance.”</mark> [Page 11](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/NRAC2WPI?page=11&annotation=4RK85TD3) - <mark class="hltr-yellow">"NSA telephone metadata program”</mark> [Page 11](zotero://open-pdf/library/items/NRAC2WPI?page=11&annotation=QWX48D9D) > [!context] > ==(How this article relates to other work in the field; how it ties in with key issues and findings by others, including yourself)== > context:: > [!significance] > ==(to the field; in relation to your own work)== > significance::